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Abstract: 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton opened her now famous “Solitude of Self” by asserting her desire to 
make manifest the “individuality of each human soul.” Using Stanton’s attempt to display the 
human soul as a case study, I consider in this essay the capacities of language to disclose the self. 
I argue that, for Stanton, self-disclosure is fundamentally performative: the “Solitude of Self” 
evokes the “inner-being we call ourself” through a reliance on, and a subsequent violation of, a 
distinctively narrative logic. As this violation takes from the audience the sense of order that the 
narrative had theretofore provided, it puts the audience in a position where they, now shorn of 
narrative and the order it provided, can experience firsthand the solitude of self. 
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Stanton’s “Solitude of Self” as Public Confession 
 
On January 18, 1892, Elizabeth Cady Stanton delivered her now-canonical speech, “The Solitude 
of Self.” First delivered to the House Committee on the Judiciary, the achievement of the speech 
was immediately recognized. The House Committee printed ten thousand copies at its own 
expense and distributed them throughout the country; Stanton’s better-known partner in the 
woman’s movement, Susan B. Anthony, called the speech the “most unanswerable argument” 
for the “full freedom and franchise of women;” and according to rhetorical scholar Beth M. 
Waggenspack, Stanton herself considered it her best speech.1 Almost one hundred years later, in 
one of the few essays dedicated to Stanton’s “Solitude of Self,” Karlyn Kohrs Campbell assured 
us that Stanton’s speech remained a classic “statement of the principles and values underlying 
the struggle for women’s rights.”2
 By 1892 Stanton had long been a radical voice in the movement for women’s suffrage. 
Historian Elisabeth Griffith notes, however, that by the 1890s Stanton’s physical limitations 
“determined” her daily routine: speaking engagements dramatically decreased and most of her 
time was dedicated to “thinking and writing.”
  
3 Perhaps because of this distance from the 
immediacies of the conflict, Stanton chose not to use her last major address—what Campbell has 
referred to as the “climax” of her oratorical career—to reiterate one more time the tired and by-
then “familiar” arguments for women’s enfranchisement.4 Instead, Stanton used “Solitude of 
Self” to explore, in a rather philosophical register, the humanism and individualism that she 
believed undergirded the women’s movement.5 Susanna Kelly Engbers does an admirable job 
connecting the philosophical musings of “Solitude” to the political goals Stanton had long 
pursued: The speech, she writes, “is a meditation on the necessary solitary condition of all 
human beings and the corresponding duty of a political system to acknowledge that isolation and 
allow each citizen to exercise ‘every faculty of mind and body’ to accomplish his or her own 
necessary work.”6
 From the very first sentence of her text, Stanton emphasized that “rights of woman” must 
not be divorced from the ontological question of “what belongs to her as an individual.”
 Engbers’ excellent summary, however, should not occlude the fact that, in 
“Solitude of Self,” the philosophical focus on the “necessary solitary condition” of humanity 
takes clear precedent over the political “duty” of acknowledgement.  
7 Not 
until this fundamental question was settled could the debate proceed to consider the “rights of 
woman” as a citizen, a female, a mother, etc. Unless the ontological individuality of women was 
acknowledged, the pursuit of rights based on questions of citizenship and gender roles would 
ultimately prove specious. In practical terms, this meant that arguments for women’s suffrage 
that claimed female enfranchisement as a means of enabling women to better care for their 
homes, families, or even their polities were fundamentally shortsighted. For even the argument 
that enfranchisement would allow women more access to the public sphere still elided the 
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ontological question Stanton sought to foreground, for public-sphere based arguments 
foreground the woman-as-citizen rather than the woman-as-individual.  Stanton thus uses the 
“Solitude of Self” as an opportunity to wax philosophical, to momentarily set aside the demands 
for workable proposals and practical solutions, and to focus her audience on the ontological 
individuality of the self. In her words, “The point I wish plainly to bring before you on this 
occasion is the individuality of each human soul” (372).  
 In our postmodern age it is tempting to dismiss as impossible Stanton’s attempt to 
disclose “our inner being which we call ourself, [which] no eye nor touch of man or angel has 
ever pierced” (384). For you don’t have to be a particularly savant poststructuralist to know that 
if the self is, as Stanton insists, accessible only to “Omniscience” (384), than the biased, partial, 
and mundane resources of rhetoric will hardly prove capable of presenting the “inner being 
which we call ourself.” Yet, I believe it would be a mistake to simply dismiss Stanton as 
theoretically naïve, for the work of Joshua Gunn has convinced me that the immense “time and 
energy” people invest in trying to make language bear witness to the transcendent is far more 
interesting than the fact, so widely rehearsed, that such a project is bound to fail.8 In fact, in spite 
of the much-proclaimed theoretical difficulties that attend it, Stanley Fish has argued that the 
desire for a language capable of capturing a transcendent truth is recurrent. He claims that there 
have been “countless articulations” of the attempt “to construct a language from which all 
perspectival bias (a redundant phrase) has been eliminated.”9
 Both Gunn and Fish emphasize that the desire for a perspective-free language manifests 
itself in the formal properties of discourse. Gunn, for example, argues that it was precisely the 
desire for an “Adamite language in which the signified and the signifier were one in perfect 
iconicity” that drove the occultists to the creation of ever-new esoteric vocabularies.
 Gunn’s “time and energy” and 
Fish’s “countless articulations” both serve to remind us that no matter how vigorously academics 
might insist that language cannot represent the ineffable, this lesson has done nothing to temper 
the ambitions of those who, like Stanton, would seek to disclose their “inner being.”  
10 Fish, 
although he provides fewer examples, similarly argues that the drive for a language “purged of 
ambiguity” manifested itself in “linguistic reform.”11 We might expect, then, that a discourse that 
takes as its aim to display “plainly” the transcendent self (which “no eye nor touch of man or 
angel has ever pierced”) to be marked by precisely such linguistic reforms. In this sense it is not 
surprising that Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, in her insightful and much-cited essay on Stanton’s 
“Solitude,” found that, “Rhetorically, the address violates nearly all the traditional canons. It 
makes no arguments; it provides no evidence . . . . It has no logical structure.”12 As the work of 
Gunn and Fish suggests, if Stanton was to pursue her goal of presenting plainly the transcendent 
self, it was incumbent upon her to develop novel forms of address. For it was precisely by 
altering the “traditional canons” (Fish’s “linguistic reforms”) that Stanton sought in rhetoric the 
resources for her transcendent task. Thus while Campbell is certainly correct that the speech 
violates the “traditional canons” of rhetoric, this does not mean that it has “no logical structure.” 
Indeed, it is my argument that the entirety of the speech—and the conclusion in particular—is 
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superintended by a confessional logic in which the end (telos) of rhetoric is not persuasion, but 
rather the disclosure of the self. By placing “The Solitude of Self” in a confessional tradition of 
rhetoric, I am, then, able to foreground a logic that, as Campbell has aptly shown, tends to 
disappear when the speech is contextualized vis-à-vis the “traditional canons” of rhetoric. As 
such, I suggest that Stanton’s speech has much to teach rhetorical theorists about what Bradford 
Vivian has called the “modes of thought and speech” by which the self is disclosed.13
 Situating “Solitude of Self” in a confessional tradition is not as farfetched as it may seem. 
The widely read feminist historian Ann Douglas argues that less than twenty years after 
Stanton’s death in 1902, her home city of New York would turn the attempt to speak with 
“terrible honesty” of the self into something of a modish fashion. If in 1892 the attempt to 
display the individuality of the self seemed appropriate only for a radical like Stanton, the onset 
of literary modernism, from which Stanton is separated by only a sliver of time, would make 
such attempts seem commonplace.
 It reminds 
us that if we are to understand the now-ubiquitous discourse of confession, we must be willing to 
situate confessional texts outside of traditional canons and traditional “modes of thought and 
speech.”   
14 Moreover, Susanna Kelly Engbers’ fantastic reading of 
Stanton vis-à-vis the nineteenth-century discourse of sympathy also suggests that Stanton may be 
profitably placed in a confessional tradition of rhetoric. Engbers explains that Stanton must not 
be situated in a classical tradition of rhetoric that takes persuasion as its ultimate goal. Rather, 
she argues that Stanton’s rhetoric fits more comfortably in a modern tradition of rhetoric “which 
claims as its end communication.” Further, and even more explicitly, Engbers notes that “much 
of the speech is surprisingly intimate—‘rhetorically inappropriate,’ as Campbell puts it. As if 
unburdening herself of a private confession. . . .”15
 Taking one final cue from Engbers, I argue that Stanton affects this ad equation by a sort 
of “rhetorical indirection.” Drawing on Adam Smith’s lectures on rhetoric, Engbers argues that 
Stanton sympathized with her audience indirectly. Stanton, the argument runs, established 
sympathy by “refracting” her emotions through a third party, thus leading her audience 
circuitously to the desired affective response.
 In this essay, then, I take Engbers’ “as if” 
seriously, I place “Solitude of Self” in a modern, confessional tradition and read it, not to 
foreground the arguments that are marshaled for the purposes of persuasion, but rather to 
foreground the “linguistic reforms” by which Stanton sought to make language adequate to the 
task of self disclosure.  
16 I pursue a similar sort of indirection. I argue that 
Stanton alienated her audience in the strongest sense of the term; she took from them the 
capacities of narrative to order and make sense of the world and thus left them radically alone. In 
such an alienated condition, Stanton suggested, her audience could experience the very solitude 
of self, which, because it is transcendent, could never be “plainly” brought before their eyes with 
the meager resources of rhetoric.  
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 The argument proceeds in two sections. In the first section, I interrogate Stanton’s much-
repeated claim that the individuality of the self emerges only in the most extreme moments of 
life. Births, deaths, tragedies, warfare—these topoi dominate Stanton’s speech because the 
extremity of each of these topics foregrounds the individuality of each human being. Here I draw 
on the work of Kenneth Burke, for textual movement of Stanton’s text between an extreme scene 
and an individual self is a rather prominent example of Burke’s scene-agent ration. I conclude 
this section by noting the limitations of a pentadic logic for Stanton’s project. In the second 
section I provide a close reading of Stanton’s conclusion. I argue that her invocations of the 
standard eighteenth-century markers of the sublime are in fundamental tension with the 
narrative, pentadic logic that had theretofore structured the speech. But this tension is productive: 
as the sublime interrupts the narrative logic, Stanton alienated her auditors by divesting them of 
the order that her narrative had provided. Thus the auditors find themselves in an extreme scene 
all their own and are able to experience the solitude of self.  I conclude by reflecting more 
generally on how Stanton’s text shapes our understanding of public confession.  
The Work of Narrative: The Self in Extremis 
Faced with the difficulty of representing the ineffable, Stanton sought recourse to an 
extreme situation. She insisted that the solitude of self is experienced only in extremis. She said, 
“We may have many friends, love, kindness, sympathy, and charity, to smooth our pathway in 
everyday life, but in the tragedies and triumphs of human experience, each mortal stands alone” 
(381; all emphases mine). The important thing to note here is that the solitude of self emerges 
under conditions of extremity. This is what Campbell referred to as the tragedy of Stanton’s 
speech: bringing out plainly the human soul required an extreme setting.17
 It is difficult to overestimate the energy that Stanton expends developing this point. 
Indeed, the speech reads as a veritable catalogue of extreme situations and superlatives 
modifying scenic descriptors. A few examples. Stanton argues that the solitude of self emerges in 
the “emergency” and the “hour of danger” (374). It is, for example, the soldier at war who 
experiences the solitude of self (375). Children, before they have any training, also experience 
the emergence of the unadorned self. Stanton tells the story of a little girl who received no 
presents on Christmas morning: “in the hours of her keenest suffering” she experienced the 
solitude of self. Stanton continues: the solitude comes in our “most bitter disappointments” and 
“brightest hopes” (375). It is experienced in “anxiety and agony,” in the experience of “broken 
friendship or shattered love”; it comes to us in our “greatest triumphs and darkest tragedies”; it 
manifests itself in the “divine heights of human achievement” and in the “prison cell” (376). The 
individual self shines in the “hour of . . . deepest humiliation,” and in the “deeper tragedies” of 
life (377). Not surprisingly, the aged also experience the solitude of self (378), as do the women 
“suffering in the prisons of St. Petersburg; in the long weary marches to Siberia, and in the 
mines” (379). In sum, Stanton concludes, it is “in the supreme moments” of life that the solitude 
 The individual soul 
will not be experienced in everyday life, only in its tragedies and triumphs.  
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of self comes to the fore: “Whatever may be said of man’s protecting power in ordinary 
conditions, amid all the terrible disasters by land and sea, in the supreme moments of danger” the 
woman experiences the solitude of self (383).  
 The superlatives continue, but I trust the point is made. The self qua self exists and is 
experienced only in extremis. Accordingly, Stanton’s speech is an unrelenting barrage of 
superlatives seeking to portray the experience of the individual self. The solitude of self, then, is 
figured with recourse to the extreme scene. This movement back and forth between an extreme 
scene and the agent as such is underwritten, or authorized, by a narrative logic. Pace Campbell, 
who suggests that Stanton’s “Solitude of Self” “must be distinguished from the narrative and 
dramatic,” I believe the free movement that we see time and again between an extreme scene and 
the agent as such depends precisely on a “narrative and dramatic” logic.18 This is most clearly 
seen with the aid of Burke’s Pentad—a critical heuristic designed to allow the critic to 
understand all discourse as a story, or a narrative or, in Burke’s term, a drama. Developing his 
notion of “dramatism,” Burke argues that there is a “synecdochic relation” between the scene 
and the agent.19 In a sentence that seems as if it were a commentary on Stanton’s speech, Burke 
writes, “By logic of the scene-agent ratio, if the scene is supernatural in quality, the agent 
contained by this scene will partake of the same supernatural quality.”20 There could hardly be a 
better description of Stanton’s text: the supernatural solitude of self is understood in terms of the 
extreme, indeed supernatural, scene. Stanton, I might note, suggests that the solitude of self is 
seen in the “agonies” of Jesus on the cross—a supernatural scene indeed. Without this 
synecdochic relation provided by the logic of narrative, Stanton would be unable to present the 
“inner-being” of the self with recourse to scenic conditions. For on its face, the notion is absurd: 
who would dare say that essence could be represented by scene, or that the agent could be 
captured by her placement, or, in Burke’s terms, that substance could be represented by sub-
stance. As scholars from Nietzsche to Hayden White have insisted, however, the trope of 
synecdoche enables language to approach the ineffable. As Nietzsche scholar Tim Murphy put it, 
“The central feature that Nietzsche notes about synecdoche here is that it is a process of selecting 
an aspect of a thing and representing that aspect as the whole, even the essence, of the thing from 
which it is selected.”21
 In sum, as Stanton labored to bring the solitude of self plainly before her audience, she 
relied on a fundamentally narrative, synecdochal logic. It was this logic that made possible the 
passage from an extreme scene to the inner being of the self. This was a brilliant move on the 
part of Stanton. Her recourse to a synecdocally infused narrative allowed her to approach the 
ineffable indirectly, or figuratively. And yet, we know from the first line of her speech that she 
must have been dissatisfied with this. For she did not want to present the individual soul 
figuratively; rather, “the point I wish plainly to bring before you on this occasion is the 
individuality of the human soul” (372, emphasis mine). For a “plain” presentation of the inner 
 In Stanton’s speech, it is not so much that the part may be substituted for 
the whole, but, following Murphy, that a part of one’s experience (the extreme part) may be 
substituted for the essence of one’s individuality.  
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self, a narrative logic would simply not do. For this purpose Stanton needed to abandon the 
narrative that had thus far structured her speech and turn instead to a sublime logic.  
The Work of the Sublime: The Human Soul Brought Plainly Before You 
 Burke warns that one of the dangers of a narrative logic is that the agent merges with, and 
becomes indistinguishable from, the scene. Burke fears that the communion between agent and 
scene might become so intimate that the boundary that separates scene and agent might begin to 
blur and “human figures” would thus “[dissolve] into their background.”22
In the highways of Palestine; in prayer and fasting on the solitary mountaintop; in the 
Garden of Gethsemane; before the judgment-seat of Pilate; betrayed by one of his trusted 
disciples at his last supper; in his agonies on the cross, even Jesus of Nazareth, in those 
last sad days on the earth, felt the solitude of self. (381) 
 The extremity of 
Stanton’s scenes, however, seems to suggest an opposite problem. She employs so many 
superlatives to describe the scene that one begins to wonder if there could be any communion at 
all with such a scene. Can the logic of narrative really support a movement between an extreme 
scene and a self? Stanton is here pushing the limits of narrative. Consider her reading of Jesus’ 
solitude:  
This passage exhibits the work of narrative. Note the relationship and communion between scene 
and agent. But one must note also the strain on the powers of narrative; the story is a 
compendium of un-common experiences, of un-shared extreme moments, and, most importantly, 
un-shared scenes. Jesus alone was abducted in the Garden of Gethsemane, stood trial before 
Pilate, and was crucified by those he claimed to love. It would seem that the ability of narrative 
to move freely between scene and agent depends on shared experiences of place, whereas the 
extremity of the passion narrative seems to preclude this identification. Indeed, in all of Burke’s 
examples, the scene stands in synecdochal relation to the self primarily because the scene is a 
common scene; the audience knows what sort of people congregate in, say, a den or a 
countryside, and can thus move from the setting to the self.23
Indeed, I want to argue that in the critical closing paragraphs of the speech, Stanton’s 
descriptions of extremity violate the limits of the narrative form. In her conclusion she recounts 
the writings of a “recent writer” who experienced the solitude of self in angry seas and soaring 
mountains. The passage is important, and I here quote it at length: 
 By emphasizing the extremity of 
the scene, Stanton pushes the limits of the narrative form and the capacities of the Pentad.   
I remember once, in crossing the Atlantic, to have gone upon the deck of the ship at 
midnight, when a dense black cloud enveloped the sky, and the great deep was roaring 
madly under the lashes of demoniac winds. My feeling was not of danger or of fear . . . 
but of utter desolation and loneliness. Again I remember to have climbed the slopes of 
the Swiss Alps, up beyond the point where vegetation ceases, and the stunted conifers no 
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longer struggle against the unfeeling blasts. Around me lay a huge confusion of rocks, 
out of which the gigantic ice peaks shot into the measureless blue of the heavens; and 
again my only feeling was the awful solitude. (384) 
At this point in the speech, the scene is not simply extreme, it is sublime: it is beyond 
description, it resists disclosure, and, Stanton insists, it cannot be measured. On this score it is 
indicative that Stanton chose roaring seas and measureless mountains as the two scenes with 
which to end her speech, for these two scenes are, thanks to Kant, the standard eighteenth-
century markers of the sublime. Indeed, the logic here is of a distinctly Kantian cast: the 
experience of the sublime casts the human mind back upon itself. Kant suggests that 
confrontation with extreme magnitude “makes us judge as sublime not so much the object as the 
mental attunement in which we find ourselves when we estimate the object.”24 In other words, 
the experience of the sublime is, perforce, an experience of the self. Kant thus concludes that the 
self is “subjectively purposive.”25 Or, in other words, when the human mind is confronted with 
“shapeless mountains piled on one another in wild disarray, with their pyramids of ice, or the 
gloomy raging sea” it “feels elevated in its own judgment of itself when it contemplates these 
[things].”26 Given the similarities in logic between Stanton and Kant (sublime scene leads to an 
experience of the self), the similarities of examples (mountains and seas), and the similarities of 
emotive responses to the sublime (both Stanton and Kant emphasize that one does not respond to 
the sublime in fear27
 That, however, is a question for another time. My point here is that, in the all-important 
conclusion of the speech, the scene, with reference to which the solitude of self has consistently 
been figured, is no longer simply extreme, but sublime. It is significant for my purposes that 
Kant insists that the sublime is only “universally communicable” because of what he calls the 
“sensus communis”: “a sense shared [by all of us], i.e. in our thought, of everyone else’s way of 
presenting [something].”
) one cannot help but wonder if Kant was the “recent writer” to whom 
Stanton refers.  
28 In other words, the sublime situation is communicable only because 
all human minds are hard-wired after the same fashion—they all present things, Kant insists, in 
the same way. It is here that I must take my leave of Kant and side, instead, with one of his best 
students, Hannah Arendt. Arendt suggests that if there is any genuine sensus communis, it is only 
in the fact that “we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as 
anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.”29
 To the extent that Arendt is correct that the human condition is one of plurality, the 
sublime becomes literally incommunicable—for there is no common ground that could make two 
people identify the sublime object in a similar fashion. And thus it follows that there can be no 
communion between a sublime scene and the self. What I am getting at is this: Stanton has so 
emphasized the sublimity of the extreme scene that she has broken the power of the Pentad and 
by extension the logic of narrative that has, to this point, authorized the presentation of the self 
through scenic invocations. She has, it seems, undercut the very logic that has supported her 
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speech; the logic of narrative authorized the movement between agent and scene, but by casting 
the scene as sublime and thereby wholly un-common, Stanton has broken the power of narrative 
to accomplish its task.  
 In another place, Hannah Arendt notes that it is among the powers of narrative to give 
order to the otherwise chaotic nature of our lives.30 Indeed, the order-giving power of narrative is 
widely attested. To cite only one further example, Hayden White quotes Levi-Strauss to argue 
that it is the task of narrative to impose order on the “blooming, buzzing confusion” of the 
world.31
 It is as though the weakness of narrative and the subsequent failure of the pentad 
produced, for Stanton, a truth-effect and allowed her “plainly to bring” the self qua self before 
her auditors. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell put it perfectly, “To encounter the speech is to experience 
the magnitude of human solitude.”
 By grounding her speech in a narrative logic, Stanton’s speech also provided order. Yet, 
if I am correct that, in the conclusion of the speech, the powers of narrative falter under the 
weight of the incommunicable sublime, then this failure of narrative is also a divestment of order 
and an imposition of chaos upon her auditors. The auditors of Stanton’s speech have been living 
in the order she has provided for them. That order dissolved with the failure of narrative and the 
auditors thus find themselves in precisely the chaotic condition for which Stanton has just 
provided the protocols of reading. They find themselves in extremis, without order and without a 
story; in short they find themselves confronted with the sheer experience of being and they have 
nothing (no story, no narrative, no order) save for the resources that they have within themselves. 
They experience, in Stanton’s words, the solitude of self, or in Kant’s words, the subjective 
purposivity of a world divested of narrative.  
32
Conclusion: Reflections on the Modern, Public Confession 
 Why? Because after insisting via a narrative logic that the 
self could be experienced only in the extreme moments of life, she put her auditors is precisely 
such a moment. She pushed narrative to the breaking point and accomplished the extremity 
necessary for the presentation of the agent apart from both the scene and the act.  
Stanton’s “Solitude of Self” was delivered in 1892, on the cusp of modernity. As I noted 
in the introduction, this was a scant thirty years before modernism would turn honest, 
unabridged, uncensored honesty into a literary fad. It is not too much, then, to read “Solitude of 
Self” as an early example of what has now become a ubiquitous genre: the public confession. 
Indeed, understanding “Solitude of Self” as a public confession teaches us two lessons about that 
genre that have endured throughout the twentieth century.  
The first lesson is that the public confession is a decisively secular genre. Stanton’s 
speech makes no references to sins that must be atoned for or mistakes that must be set right. 
Yet, her speech remains confessional in the sense that she endeavored to disclose her deepest 
self. At this point I can hazard a generalization: the modern public confession replaces the 
admission of sinfulness with the disclosure of the self as the ultimate goal of the genre. Thus, 
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although Rousseau was reading Augustine’s sin-lined Confessions as he wrote his own, in a 
typically modern spirit he concluded, “The particular object of my confessions is to make known 
my inner self.”33
The second lesson of Stanton’s “Solitude of Self” is that the public confession is a 
decisively modern genre. Campbell was correct that Stanton’s “Solitude of Self” violates “nearly 
all traditional canons.” This fact, combined with the enduring popularity—indeed, the 
canonicity—of the text, forces us to ask difficult questions regarding the limits of our “traditional 
canons.” For how could a speech that “makes no arguments” and “provides no evidence” be so 
manifestly successful? I suggest that the sheer endurance of this “strange speech,” reminds us 
that the now-ubiquitous practice of public confession cannot be explained with recourse to a 
Graeco-Roman tradition of rhetoric centered on concepts of persuasion, argument, and evidence. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the public confession is a decisively modern phenomenon, rooted in 
the rhetorical theory of the Enlightenment.
  
34
If the public confession is a fundamentally modern phenomena, it should not be 
surprising to us that so many contemporary public confessions operate with an Enlightenment 
epistemology. From the confession of Jimmy Swaggart in 1988 to the confessions of Bill Clinton 
in 1998, to the confessions of former New Jersey Governor James McGreevey in 2004 and 2006, 
each of these confessants assumed that language was little more than a glassy medium through 
which their true selves could be revealed without distortion. As critics it is, of course, requisite 
that we register the impossibility of this task and complicate the assumptions about language that 
undergird the entire genre of public confession. But, as I argued above with recourse to Gunn 
and Fish, it is equally important (and far more interesting) to demonstrate how the desire to 
present the self “plainly” before the public manifests itself in the formal properties of the 
confessions themselves.  
 Stanton’s confessional “Solitude of Self” is no 
different, grounded as it is in the Enlightenment belief that the experience of the sublime is 
subjectively purposive, casting the subject back onto the truth that is hers alone.  
In the case of Stanton, I have argued that her desire to present her “inner being” 
manifested itself in the performative nature of her text. To the extent my reading holds, Stanton’s 
presentation of the solitary self depends not on a semiotic logic of sign and signifier, but on the 
performance of providing a narrative order for the audience and then taking it from them. Indeed, 
as I suggested in the introduction, it doesn’t take great theoretical savvy to know that language 
cannot represent the ineffable. It is thus of the utmost significance that Stanton does not attempt 
to represent the solitary self. As Campbell put it, she “evokes” it; she enables the audience to 
“encounter” it. The very performance of her speech cast her auditors into an experience in which 
they, now divested of the comforts of narrative, might themselves encounter a being that could 
never be represented.  
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Thus the modern confession, although it sets for itself an impossible task, it must not be 
dismissed as philosophically naïve. The form of the confession as well as its very performance 
harbor resources to which the traditional canons are blind. For, at least as far as Stanton is 
concerned, the power of the public confession lies not in the arguments advanced or the evidence 
provided. Rather, the power of the public confession resides in its performative capacity to evoke 
an “encounter” with the self.  
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